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1. UN sentiment regarding action against China--The US delegation at the UN, in an assessment of reaction in the UN to the US proposal for condemning the Chinese Communists as aggressors in Korea, reports that the US proposal has already been approved in principle by most Latin American nations and by several other states. The delegation adds that the Commonwealth countries, most of the Asian-Arab group, and several Western European nations remain unconvinced of the usefulness or desirability of condemning aggression or imposing sanctions against China on the grounds either that UN members lack the means to follow through effectively or that the proposed measures will not hurt the war-making ability of the Chinese Communists nor deflect their aggressive intentions. Many delegates feel that condemnatory action would provoke the Chinese Communists to new aggressive moves, or at least cement their dependence on Moscow. The delegation notes, however, that US acquiescence in the intermediate step of adopting the cease-fire group's supplemental report should help win support for the condemnatory resolution.

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State Dept. review completed

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3. **BURMA: Pro-US sentiment increasing--US Embassy Rangoon estimates that anti-Communist sentiment in Burma is stronger than ever before, despite discouragement over UN military reverses in Korea and Commonwealth talks of appeasement and compromise. According to the Embassy, the "softening" British stand in the Far East has led the Burmese to look to the US as their only source of assistance to meet aggression. The Embassy cites as the most important factors preventing all-out Burmese cooperation with the West: (a) internal military weakness; (b) fear that the US is not yet prepared for all-out war; and (c) a desire to prevent Burma's becoming a second Korea.**

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